As a result, we can state that relations between Iran and the Houthis are pretty uncertain and that the steps taken by the Tehran administration have aroused some suspicions among the Houthis. Finally, although Iran has recently carried out missile attacks on points located in Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria, considering that Iran has not been involved in conventional warfare since its war with Iraq, we can determine that these attacks are of limited operation value due to being limited in scope and directed at MOSSAD and ISIS targets. Iran’s regional foreign policy has changed due to the Raisi administration coming to power and may continue to change.
Considering the recent rapprochement between the Western World and Gulf Countries, bringing Dahlan to power in Palestine as a figure cleansed of Hamas and supported by the West could mean the restart of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and perhaps the finalization of peace. However, it’s another mystery how Turkey will view Dahlan, who has been declared the number one state enemy in Turkey, becoming the president of the “brother” Palestinian people.
In conclusion, the “COP28, Progress or Regression” report prepared by Üsküdar University and the Caribbean ASEAN Council indicates that COP28 presents the most ambitious agenda so far, despite legitimate concerns about the adequacy of measures proposed by the COP28 Presidency and the role of oil industries in shaping the agenda. If emission, renewable energy, and climate finance targets are achieved at COP28, it will fundamentally accelerate the policy changes urgently needed for transformation. Therefore, delegates and campaigners should focus on helping and encouraging the emergence of a global agreement on the items on the agenda at COP28. If successful, COP28 could give birth to the most robust global climate agreement negotiated so far, and future COPs can build upon it to maintain a more comprehensive and rapid transformation.
It is important to avoid ideological discourse that increases fragility in foreign policy for the sake of scoring points in domestic politics. Strengthening economic and diplomatic relations with Gulf countries stands among the priority steps that will increase Turkey’s regional effectiveness. Addressing these policies with a holistic approach and implementing them in a coordinated manner is of great importance for protecting Turkey’s regional and global interests.
Considering that the already weak emotional bond with the West in societies in the region is completely lost due to Israel’s military operation style being inexplicable in dimensions, it won’t be difficult for the BRICS line to produce more social consent. The fact that BRICS leadership and parties do not engage in any initiatives-actions that will lose diplomatic ground will allow the political course to progress in their favor. It is also necessary to note the moderate approaches of energy-exporting countries towards the West.
Finally, a short-term way out for the Turkish diaspora will be to cooperate with other diasporas. The lobbying power of the Jewish diaspora was working in favor of Turkey until the Mavi Marmara attack in 2010 when relations between the two countries soured. However, the now isolated Turkish diaspora can somewhat close this gap by working jointly with the diasporas of Azerbaijan and other Turkic states. Moreover, such a sharp division as seen in the Turkish diaspora is not observed in the diasporas of these countries. Moves in this direction, especially with the momentum created by the Organization of Turkic States, will strengthen the hand not only of Turkey but also of other Turkic states. Additionally, the “related communities” mentioned in the name of YTB is a sign that this support can receive the support of not only other Turkish diasporas but also wider audiences. The combined power of a group of diasporas that cooperate by mutually looking after each other’s interests can save the Turkish diaspora from the dilemma it is currently in.
The status of military companies, which are the descendants of mercenary knights who were the main forces of wars in the Middle Ages before the permanent regular army in the Modern Age, will be discussed more and even new regulations will be made. However, they will always inevitably reflect the structure of the employer state within the company.
In general, it seems quite possible that the position of these three disputed islands developing under the shadow of Russia-Iran relations will affect Iran and Russia relations indirectly. Iran’s complete unwillingness to give up sovereignty rights of these islands and willingness to defend them strengthens the possibility of a crisis regarding these islands in the future. On the other hand, Russia’s close relations with the UAE and other gulf countries create a dilemma in developing relations between Russia and Iran. There is a possibility that Russia might use the crisis arising from the position of these three islands as leverage against Iran. Finally, this situation reminds us of the US following a pro-Greece policy in the continental shelf issue between Greece and Turkey and the Cyprus issue.
Setting aside the groundlessness of claims that Istanbul Canal would eliminate Montreux, directing dangerous vessels that will pass through the Strait to the canal could prevent endangering the Bosphorus and Istanbul. However, opening a canal without making changes to the Montreux Straits Convention and Turkish Straits Maritime Traffic Regulations seems meaningless. Because Turkey does not have legal arguments to prevent and direct ships wanting to benefit from the right of free passage through the straits to the canal. After calculating the cost and environmental risks of opening a canal, if decided, Turkey can revise the Montreux Convention by putting forward its environmental concerns to ensure dangerous vessels pass through the canal. For this, it is sufficient to resort to the review and termination provisions found within Montreux itself.
