Turkish Foreign Policy Changing?

Changing Methods and Initiatives
It has been 3 months since Erdoğan won the elections. Although there are signs that he is inclined to abandon the political line he has pursued since 2016, it is possible to say that he will essentially position himself in an even more security-oriented line. The former head of MIT (National Intelligence Organization), Hakan Fidan, who was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, does not hide his security-focused perspective. It is possible to prove with a few examples that the AKP government’s tendency to instrumentalize foreign policy has not changed.
The Ministry
Recently, it was reported in the press that Fidan is planning to make some changes regarding the future of the ministry. Fidan, who considers it a significant problem that approximately 20% of diplomats appointed by the ministry are married to foreigners, plans to start changes from this point. However, he may face problems with the Merve Kavakçı story, which the Erdoğan regime strongly embraces; Kavakçı was elected as a member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the elections just before the AKP government and was not allowed into the parliament with her headscarf; now she is married to a foreigner and also has dual citizenship. Merve Kavakçı is currently the ambassador to Kuala Lumpur, and her daughter from her foreign husband, Fatima Gülham Abushanab, serves as Erdoğan’s interpreter at critical summits.
On the other hand, the format of the ministry’s weekly briefing meetings has also completely changed. The press members are requested to submit the questions they plan to ask via email in advance. These meetings are no longer held physically; written statements are sent to the press members. The opportunity for journalists to ask simultaneous questions to the ministry spokesperson has been completely eliminated. Fidan has also limited the distribution of diplomatic meeting notes within the ministry. Now, each diplomatic meeting will only be shared with the regional directorate to which it is affiliated. Other units of the ministry will not be aware of every meeting and its notes.
Fidan, who has changed the ministry’s civilian and diplomatic vehicles with security-focused approaches, has also initiated the practice of searching with trained dogs, regardless of who comes to the ministry and for what reason. The fact that he is the minister who has received the most assassination threats in the history of the ministry also plays a role in this.
Coup in Niger; Turkey’s Stance
Military coups that have occurred one after another in ECOWAS countries in the last few years have begun to cause political instability in the region. The coup administrations are trying to legitimize themselves especially with opposition to France and colonialism. The increasing influence of terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda, along with Tuareg rebellions, is expanding the conflict areas. Turkey condemned the military coup and called for a return to democracy as soon as possible.
Turkey, one of the largest military equipment suppliers to the Niger government overthrown by the coup, has been trying to increase its influence in Africa especially since 2008. For this purpose, Turkey did not hesitate to take sides even in the civil wars of countries such as Libya, Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia, and came face to face with both Middle Eastern and Western countries.
It is quite clear that Erdoğan and Fidan are aspiring to the sphere of influence that will be vacated by France in Niger. However, they aim to achieve this without confronting Russia. Turkey already has military cooperation with all ECOWAS countries, including the modernization and expansion of the Nigerian navy. Erdoğan and Fidan seem willing to enter into a power struggle to expand the export market of the defense industry. However, if ECOWAS carries out a military intervention with the support of France and the US, Turkey’s stance remains uncertain.
Due to the economic crisis and upcoming elections, Erdoğan and Fidan will also avoid opposing the West.
Libya
News that Turkey has leased a naval base in El Khums for 99 years has found considerable space in the Arab press and was met with reaction. The Libyan government, however, clearly denied these claims. However, Turkey already effectively controls the Tripoli port. Military personnel and equipment sent by Turkey at the request of the Libyan government were transferred from this port. In fact, Haftar forces’ advance was stopped for the first time with howitzers deployed in the port area.
Fidan’s security-focused approach supports increasing Turkey’s military bases in foreign countries. In this context, besides the bases in Iraq and Syria, permanent bases in Qatar, Somalia, and Sudan were established during his time as MIT undersecretary. The expansion of the airfield in the Geçitkale region in Northern Cyprus to establish an air base and the construction of a naval base in the Karpaz region have begun to be frequently mentioned.
Comments about creating a fully-equipped security area in the Eastern Mediterranean by establishing a base in Libya have also begun to be discussed in public. However, this initiative, which is likely to damage the normalization process with Egypt, is currently being postponed.
Analysis
In the past 3 months, 2 important opposition journalists were arrested and sent to prison without a reputable crime being attributed to them. The path followed by the Erdoğan government does not have the aim of carrying Turkey to a democratization process. In addition, there is no concrete step indicating that security-oriented policies have been abandoned.
Erdoğan’s attempts to alleviate the economic crisis before the municipal elections, which he attaches great importance to, gained visibility with his Middle East tour. Erdoğan, who did not change his stance against Russia’s attempt to invade Ukraine, occupied the alliance’s agenda for a long time in the process of Sweden’s NATO membership and tried to obtain economic support behind the scenes.
Likewise, the necessity to normalize completely frozen relations with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates is directly linked to the economic crisis.
Erdoğan needs to achieve a significant victory in the municipal elections to financially sustain associations and foundations that operate in accordance with his agenda; to continue social engineering. For this, he is in need of the support of urban and secular voters.
Although Erdoğan won the past elections by a small margin, he lagged behind his rival in almost all of Turkey’s metropolitan cities. Erdoğan plans to face urban and secular voters with “a portrait that has gained the trust and support of the West” and with a step towards returning to rational economic policies. For this purpose, he also formed the new cabinet from pro-Western and moderate names.
On the other hand, it is being evaluated in political corridors that Erdoğan is considering declaring a general amnesty on October 29, 2023, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey, and releasing Kurdish politicians. Thus, he hopes that Kurdish political parties will nominate their own candidates in the upcoming municipal elections and not support CHP candidates.
Undoubtedly, presenting this general amnesty issue to his counterparts in the West as a step towards democratization and trying to gain sympathy are among his aims.
In summary, when it comes to Turkish foreign policy, the AKP government does not give up on its goal of converting all the steps it takes into domestic political gain. In this sense, in the upcoming 7-month period, an agenda is being followed in accordance with Erdoğan’s goal of generating financial resources for local elections. Turkey seems to have an unpredictable and non-negotiable diplomatic identity for a while longer.