How Real Is the “New Corridor” Narrative in the Eastern Mediterranean?
Over the past few weeks, debates along the Eastern Mediterranean-Balkans axis have flared up again, bringing some very ambitious scenarios about the region’s energy architecture back into the spotlight. Ukraine’s mounting winter demand,Greece’s deepening coordination with the United States, Türkiye’s infrastructure strength andRussia’s sharp rhetorichave all helped amplify a narrative of a “new geostrategic axis bypassing both Moscow and Ankara.” It is a compelling narrative. Yet once we look at actual capacities, the physical structure of the networks, and the direction of gas flows, a clear gap appears between what is happening on the ground and the mood created by this storyline.
This discussion is not new. The so-calledVertical Gas Corridor (VGC)has been on the radar of European institutions and the United States since 2024. What is new isGreece’s enhanced visibility in LNG-based flows toward Ukraine, which has brought the issue back to the center of the energy agenda this month. At this point, a basic conceptual distinction is essential. From a technical perspective, what makes something a “corridor” is a continuous chain of pipelines linking source to market. What Greece offers today is not a new pipeline system; it is an LNG chain built around the Alexandroupolis floating terminal, theRevithoussaterminal, theGreece-Bulgaria interconnector (IGB)and theBRUA systemfurther north. This chain is undeniably important for a war-torn country like Ukraine that needs flexibility, but it does not by itself transform the region’s established pipeline backbone.
Reading capacity correctly is therefore essential. On paper, the Alexandroupolis terminal has a technical capacity of around5.5 bcmper year. In practice, commissioning delays and the inevitable teething pains of stabilizing operations meant that actual flows fell short of that figure, and the terminal only began to ramp up operations betweenAugustandOctober. At Revithoussa, upgrades have raised nominal capacity, but the real constraint is not the tanks themselves. It is the national grid’s exit limitations, domestic demand pressures and technical constraints on pressure management. As a result, the net exportable volume that can realistically be sent north remains in the range of2-3 bcmper year[1]. When these two entry points are combined with IGB and the BRUA system, the VGC’s effective flow capacity in 2025 sits in roughly the6-8 bcmrange[2]. In the medium term, a10 bcmtarget[3]is plausible, but today’s physical reality still falls short of that. The VGC is therefore a meaningful additional channel for Ukraine’s access to non-Russian gas, particularly in winter. It is not, however, a new corridor that fundamentally overturns the strategic balance. It functions more as an added breathing space within the existing architecture.
At this stage, it is also useful to draw a clear line between a “trading hub” and an “energy node.” A hub is a market structure with multiple entry and exit points, where prices are discovered transparently and where liquidity is deep. A node, by contrast, is primarily a strategic junction through which certain volumes pass. Greece today is a successful energy node. This description does not diminish Athens’ importance; it defines its role accurately. Greece’s leverage stems from its full alignment with EU energy law, from the political coordination it has developed with Washington under the3+1 format, and from the prominent role it has assumed in LNG shipments linked to Ukraine. Even so, the physical volumes handled remain limited. Greece is not a producer and it is not a large-scale distribution center. Yet the political signal Athens sends is far larger than the volumes flowing through its pipes.The anchoring of US-sourced LNG in the regionstrengthensthe Washington-Brussels-Athens triangle in Ukraine-related decision-making. It is also worth noting that Western motivation here is not only to bypass Türkiye geographically. At least at the level of official discourse, the primary goal is to build an LNG route with clearly certified origin, designed tomitigate the risk of “Russian molecules”commingling in pipeline gas routed via Türkiye.
Türkiye’s position in this picture sits on a completely different plane. Türkiye unquestionably possesses the largest physical infrastructure in the region. Its regasification capacity stands in the 50-60 bcm per year range[4]. Some technical estimates put the theoretical ceiling even higher, but what shapes market dynamics is not potential on paper; it is effective usable capacity. With more LNG terminals than the rest of Eastern Europe combined, Türkiye is oftendescribedas the real physical engine of regional gas flows, with an estimated 25-30 bcm of spare regasification capacity. On top of this lies a dense web of pipelines: TANAP, TurkStream, Blue Stream and the Iran-Türkiye line together turn the country into a major intake and outlet manifold between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Production from the Sakarya field is gradually reinforcing the domestic balance as an additional local source.
None of this, however, automatically makes Türkiye a genuine gas hub. It makes Türkiye a physical hub, not by definition a commercial one. Becoming a real trading center requires more than steel in the ground. It demands transparent price formation, independent and credible market institutions and a regulatory framework that is predictable over time. Türkiye’s physical capacity is indisputably high. Converting that capacity into a mature hub architecture, however, depends on the depth and reliability of its gas market, not only on the number of pipelines and LNG terminals.
Azerbaijan’s role in this picture deserves its own paragraph. No amount of political rhetoric or “bypass” narrative changes a basic fact: the main pipeline backbone for gas flows toward Europe is TANAP, with TAP as its extension inside the EU. This reality gives Azerbaijan an independent strategic weight that is not simply a derivative of Ankara-Athens competition. For Baku, the VGC is not a rival to TANAP, but a potential complementary outlet into Balkan markets. The coexistence of this pipeline backbone with LNG-based routes shows that, in the medium term, these channels do not cancel each other out. Instead, they reinforce diversification when they are managed in a coordinated way.
In this context, it would be simplistic to dismiss Russia’s sharp reaction to Greece’s arrangements with Ukraine as “just rhetoric.” It is true that Moscow’s tone is habitually hard. It is also true that Russian gas dominance in the Balkans has eroded significantly over the past three years. Across the EU, Russia’s overall market share has fallen toaround 15 percent. In the Balkans, the picture is mixed. Some countries, such as Bulgaria, have sharply reduced their reliance on Russian gas, while others, such as Serbia, still maintain high levels of dependence. This trend progressively blunts one of the Kremlin’s most important tools: the ability to weaponize energy. At the same time, this erosion does not mean that Russian gas has disappeared from the system. In fact, EU imports of Russian gas, especially via LNG, increased byroughly 18 percentin 2024. This reboundunderlinesthat projects like the VGC are being designed not only as alternative routes, but also as filters intended to limit the space through which Russian molecules can continue to seep into the European system.
Taken together, the picture is clear. For now, competition dominates the current landscape. The nature of Türkiye-Greece relations, the friction between Ankara and Brussels, and the complex political files of the Eastern Mediterranean all constrain the emergence of a spontaneously complementary architecture. Yet Europe’s long-term energy security cannot rest on locking these structures into a purely zero-sum confrontation. It requires channelling this competition into a framework of managed rivalry that leaves room for functional complementarity. What is changing today is not the primary direction of the backbone, but the system’s flexibility. What is not changing is the physical reality imposed by pipelines and large-scale infrastructure. To understand what is really happening, it is therefore necessary to look beyond slogans and focus on maps, capacities and flow directions.
The Eastern Mediterranean’s energy architecture cannot be sustainably built on the notion that one side’s absolute gain must be the other’s absolute loss. Greece’s political flexibility, Türkiye’s physical capacity and Azerbaijan’s resource base are all elements of a single regional equation. They may be in competition, but they are not inherently mutually exclusive. The real task is to bring this competition onto a manageable plane and, over time, to strengthen an architecture in which these pieces can complement rather than undermine one another. From the standpoint of Europe’s energy security, that is the path most firmly grounded in both logic and reality.
[1]This calculation is based onDESFA’s 2025 annual slot allocation results for the Revithoussa Terminal(35 TWh $\approx$ 3.31 bcm) and data placingGreece’s average annual domestic consumption in the 6–7 bcm range. Given that a significant portion of incoming volumes is absorbed by domestic demand, and considering technical bottlenecks within the national grid, the net exportable “LNG surplus” available for northbound flow (to Ukraine/the Balkans) is technically limited to this range.
[2]This projection is derived from aggregating the physical capacities of the Vertical Gas Corridor’s two main arteries: the 3 bcm baseline capacity of the existing IGB (Greece–Bulgaria) pipeline and the reverse flow potential (~4–5 bcm) on the Trans-Balkan line (Kulata/Sidirokastro). The target of “reaching 10 bcm in the medium term,” as outlined in theUnited States Energy Association (USEA) report, corroborates that current actual capacity remains below this ceiling, effectively sitting within the 6–8 bcm range subject to operational constraints.
[3]The medium-term 10 bcm target is grounded in data fromBulgartransgaz EAD’s “2025–2034 Ten-Year Network Development Plan” (TYNDP). The report outlines a target to increase technical capacity at the IP Negru Voda 1/Kardam interconnection point (on the VGC route towards Romania) to 295 GWh/day (See p. 17). Upon applying the standard energy unit conversion (1 bcm ≈ 10.55 TWh), this figure corresponds to an annual flow capacity of approximately 10.2 bcm.
[4]This range is a synthesis of data fromBOTAŞ’s declared daily regasification capacity of 161 million m³(approx. 58 bcm annually) and theGIIGNL (International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers) 2024 Report. The figure reflects theoretical technical capacity; actual utilization rates fluctuate depending on seasonal demand and existing pipeline gas contracts.
